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ABSTRACT
On May 25, 1979, an American Airlines DC-10 crashed just after taking off from
Chicago's O'Hare Airport. It was the worst crash in U.S. history at the time, having
killed all 271 people on board and two people on the ground.
Arriving at the scene of a plane crash is akin to walking into a play during the
third act: most of the story has already played itself out. The crash is the climax of a
complex and nuanced plot with hundreds of characters and no clear beginning or end.
Nevertheless, investigators from the National Transportation Safety Board are
responsible for reconstructing the story from the evidence. They must study the
characters and unearth the storyline and all of its twists and turns, and at the end
determine the probable cause.
The NTSB spent six months investigating the crash of Flight 191. This is the story
of how investigators pieced together the smoldering wreckage, wrestled with questions of
personal error and accountability, dodged political and financial influences, and in the
end put forth a list of safety recommendations based on the flaws they uncovered along
the way.
The investigation of Flight 191 is one example of how investigators can take an
otherwise hopeless situation and turn it into a platform for introspection and
improvement.
Thesis Supervisor: Marcia Bartusiak
Title: Visiting Professor of Writing and Humanistic Studies
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Knowing When To Stop: The Investigation of Flight 191
Just before midnight, in a field flooded with search lights, rescue workers and
volunteers milled about. They sifted through wreckage and placed markers in the ground
where bodies were found. Elwood Driver stood nearby, sipping coffee, taking in the
disastrous scene before him. "I'm a pilot since I was 18," he told The Chicago Tribune.
"Forty years. This is the worst one I've seen."
It was May 25, 1979, the Friday night of Memorial Day weekend. Fire trucks and
ambulances lined the streets; helicopters circled above like hawks; two hundred and
seventy-one people were dead. An American Airlines jumbo jet lay shattered in an
abandoned airfield less than a mile from where it had taken off-its pieces still
smoldering from the fire that erupted on impact. Driver, chairman of the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), was staring at the remains of what was, at that
point, the worst plane crash in United States history.
Arriving at the scene of a plane crash is akin to walking into a play during the
third act: most of the story has already played itself out. The crash is the climax of a
complex and nuanced plot with hundreds of characters and no clear beginning or end.
Nevertheless, NTSB investigators are responsible for reconstructing the story from the
evidence. They must study the characters and unearth the storyline and all of its twists
and turns. In short, for the next six months, Driver's team of investigators would devote
themselves to one question: What happened?
For the most part, society is willing to accept the risks of high-tech travel. The
frequency of car accidents does little to discourage automobile travel. Bad drivers and
poor driving conditions are an inescapable part of reality. But when hundreds of accidents
are caused by faulty tires that peel apart at high speeds, people take notice. We are far
less accepting of preventable risks.
As such, one of the critical questions an investigation seeks to answer is whether
the crash was the result of a preventable risk. If so, investigators are faced with the more
compelling task of determining how, exactly, the risk could have been averted: at what
point in the chain of events leading up to the crash could someone, or something, have
acted differently so as to eliminate the risk and avoid the crash? The answer is often
unclear.
Peter Galison, a professor of history of science and physics at Harvard University,
described how difficult it can be to separate human responsibility from technology in his
article, "Accident of History." He wrote, "It is always possible to trade human action for
a technological one: failure to take notice can be swapped against a system failure to
make noticeable. Conversely, every technological failure can be tracked back to the
actions of those who designed, built, or used that piece of the material world...It is an
unavoidable feature of our narratives about human technological systems that we are
always faced with a contested ambiguity between human and material causation."
This ambiguity is emblematic of any system that has levels of built-in checks and
balances: when something does go wrong, it is often impossible to discern exactly who is
deserving of the blame. When hundreds of people and decisions are involved, there often
isn 't one person to blame.
And yet, we try not to let a little confusion stand in the way of reform. Because
even if accountability isn't clear-especially if accountability isn't clear-then there is
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likely a problem with the system that needs fixing. Whether that system is aircraft
manufacturing and operation, failure testing of car tires, or national security, if it has
inherent flaws that go unrecognized and unrepaired, then future failures are certain to
arise.
We are in a race against time to understand and eliminate the risks that
accompany new technologies before a disaster occurs. Tragically, it often takes an event
to force the kind of honest introspection necessary for real improvement. In the aviation
world, every crash mandates a certain level of introspection on the part of the airlines, the
manufacturers, and the Federal Aviation Administration. Consequently, the industry has
had to put into place a method, now well-tested, for managing its self-evaluation: an
objective investigation conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board to
determine the probable cause of the crash.
The NTSB does not assign blame. Its purpose during a crash investigation is to
uncover the events that led to the tragedy and to do everything possible to prevent similar
crashes from occurring down the line. The goal is to improve safety by improving the
systems already in place. The investigation of Flight 191 is one example of how
investigators can take an otherwise hopeless situation and turn it into a platform for
introspection and improvement. We might do well, as a society preoccupied with high
profile investigations like that of the shuttle Columbia tragedy or the post 9-11 hearings,
to learn from the NTSB's example just how to handle the complexities of massive
systematic failures and still come away from them with a better system in place.
American Airlines Flight 191 began its long-haul trip to Los Angeles without
trouble, although delays at O'Hare had put it a few minutes behind schedule. It was a
mild spring day, 63 degrees with clear skies. At 3:02:38 Chicago time, the control tower
cleared American Airlines flight 191 for takeoff on runway 32R heading northwest. A
few seconds later, Captain Lux confirmed, "Ah-American one ninety-one underway."
That was the last communication Flight 191 had with the control tower.
As the plane accelerated down the runway, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR)
picked up the voice of first officer James Dillard calling out the plane's speed as it passed
through eighty knots. Everything sounded normal until just two seconds before lift-off,
when the CVR recorded a thump, followed by the word "damn" one second later-the
last recorded sound in the cockpit. A controller in the tower watched as the plane lifted
off. What he saw was almost beyond words. He shouted to the other controllers in the
tower, "Look at this-look at this-blew up an engine. Equipment-we need equipment.
He blew an engine. Holy ."
But the plane continued to gain altitude in what looked like a normal climb. The
controller radioed to the captain, "American 191, you wanna come back and to what
runway?" But there was no response. "He's not talking to me," the controller said. The
plane began a shallow left turn. The turn got steeper and steeper-too steep. "He's gonna
lose a wing," the controller said. "There he goes-there he goes." The plane, only 580
feet and 20 seconds into the air, began to dive and plunged to the ground.
The plane crashed into an old out-of-service airport field that had long since been
overshadowed by O'Hare. The space was being used as K-9 training grounds and
extended right up to the edge of a trailer park, where mobile homes lined a few loops of
pre-planned streets. Just on the other side of the park stood several oil storage tanks-an
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array of massive white cylinders with staircases winding around the outside that make the
scale of the tanks look impossibly large. "If he'd a kept going, he'd a hit the oil tanks,"
says Ken Miller, a man now in his fifties who has lived in the trailer park for over
twenty-five years and today works in the park's front office. "For miles around would'a
been devastated if he'd a hit the oil tanks."
Pieces of the shattered plane carved through some of the trailer homes and the fire
on impact took the lives of two people on the ground. But the residents of the area still
count themselves lucky. "He knew what he was doing," says Miller. "Going down, he put
it in the best place he could. We still credit that pilot."
Miller was working in nearby Skokie at the time, and got a call from his boss who
told him he'd better head home because there had been a plane crash. He says he could
see the smoke from miles away. He rushed home to find that the streets were all blocked
off. "There were nothing but fire trucks and hoses, everywhere," he remembers. "The
fuselage was out in the street over here," he said, pointing through the window to the
shady street that borders the old airfield.
The damage to the aircraft was extensive. "The air frame was, of course, severely
broken up," said investigator Henry C. Martinelli, a manager of aircraft systems
engineering for American Airlines. Because the plane crashed with a full load of fuel,
most of it was destroyed by the immense fire. The largest portions remaining were the
engines, the landing gear and part of the tail. For weeks afterward, people sifted through
the ashes, looking for parts and pieces of the airplane and for human remains. The whole
area was under tight security, but even so, there were a few thefts. "There were some sick
people," Miller recalls. "One person parked on the toll way and walked over. He wanted
to take something from one of the bodies, he wanted to take some lady's ring. They
caught some people trying to take pieces of the plane, but you know, they need every
piece to put it all back together."
The investigators didn't have much to put back together; the damage to the plane
was so complete. But they did have one major piece of the puzzle, a piece that hardly
needed any putting together at all. Back on the runway, the left engine and pylon
assembly (the structure that attaches the engine to the wing) was almost completely
intact. And to many-though not to the NTSB-that was answer enough. Why did the
plane crash? Because the engine fell off.
Of course, nothing is so simple. Like a child incessantly demanding to know
"why?", investigators are constantly searching for causes. In any investigation, answers
along the way tend to open the door to more questions. The engine fell off, but why?
Maybe it had pre-existing structural damage. If so, when, how, and why did the damage
occur? It could have fallen off because of an explosion on board-terrorism or sabotage
may have been involved. Again, who, when, why, and how?
Even these answers wouldn't be enough. Understanding why the engine fell off
was one thing, but figuring out why that caused the plane to crash was another. After all,
DC-1 Os are designed to be flyable under catastrophic circumstances, even in the event of
a complete engine loss. Why, then, couldn't the pilots bring the plane back for an
emergency landing? Maybe weather was a factor; or maybe the pilots were at fault. How
experienced were they; were they well rested; what had they had to eat or drink the night
before? All these questions and more needed to be addressed.
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The investigation of Flight 191 very early on splintered into two clear but separate
tracks. First, why did the engine fall off, and second, why did the loss of an engine cause
the plane to crash? Behind every possible solution is at least one person-someone who
caused, or more likely, failed to prevent a dangerous set of circumstances from arising.
As Galison pointed out, it can be almost impossible to distinguish between human and
technological actions. Investigators could go back and forth forever and trace the line of
causation back through time ad nauseum. As it turned out, perhaps the most difficult part
of conducting the investigation was knowing when to stop.
All major transportation systems-aviation, highway, railroad and marine-are
under the scrutinizing eye of the National Transportation Safety Board. A relatively small
government agency, the NTSB is called upon to investigate all major disasters and to
make recommendations on how to improve overall safety. From its inception in 1967 (it
is the successor of the Civil Aeronautic Authority), one of the driving philosophies has
been to maintain independence from political and financial influences. For example, it is
entirely independent from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), whose job it is to
regulate and promote aviation. To an outsider, the distinction between the two agencies
may seem subtle; but in the aviation world, they play very distinct roles. The NTSB
makes all the recommendations; the FAA makes all the rules.
The culmination of an NTSB investigation is an accident report-a publication
that can be hundreds of pages long-which states the pertinent facts, the probable cause,
and the agency's safety recommendations. "That's really our payoff, and why we exist to
begin with," says Pamela Sullivan, a senior investigator for the North Central regional
office in Chicago.
The NTSB is not responsible, or even interested, in assigning liability and blame.
"Our purpose is to improve safety," says Sullivan. "We look into these accidents to
identify areas that can be changed or improved so the same kind of accident doesn't
occur twice."
Assigning blame is left up to the courts. "We don't make any money on the sale
of the airplane. We don't lose any money on the lawsuits after the crash," says Robert
Macintosh, chief advisor of international safety affairs at the NTSB headquarters in
Washington, DC. In fact, the NTSB's accident report and probable cause are prohibited
from being used as evidence in lawsuit, precisely so the investigation will not be
influenced by financial pressure of multi-million dollar litigation.
The NTSB is among the first agencies to be notified of a crash. "We're the first
responders to the site," says Sullivan. "We'll get there whatever way we can," she says,
recalling that one of the investigators for Flight 191 had to ride to the site on the back of a
fire engine because the traffic was so bad. "It's an adventure."
And time is of the essence. "With a major accident, you don't want to lose any
evidence," she says. Even for smaller accidents, the arrival of the NTSB relieves local
authorities of responsibility over a situation they often are not equipped to handle.
"Especially in smaller communities, you'll have some local sheriff who has no idea what
to do with the airplane," says Sullivan. "They're very happy to see us arrive-someone
who's going to take control."
The NTSB has ten regional offices around the country which handle the
thousands of smaller incidents that arise each year. But for bigger crashes, the national
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office steps in. It sends a "go team" of about fifteen people, who take over the reins from
the regional investigators as soon as they arrive on the scene. The go team is always
ready to rush to the site, "any way we can get there," says Macintosh. "We bring assets
and expertise that local groups don't have."
When investigators first arrive at the sight, the first concern is safety of the
surrounding area. "The best way to describe it initially," says Sullivan, "is controlled
chaos. A lot of people trying to get organized, trying to do their jobs." The NTSB is
legally in charge of the site from the minute they arrive. "We give advice and instructions
to the law enforcement as to how we'd like to handle things," says Sullivan. "You do
what you need to do to rescue the folks and don't touch the rest. We always tell them to
treat it like a crime scene, and they understand that." Even after the fire is put out, the
safety risks linger on. "There are some nasty things out there in the site," says MacIntosh.
"Dangerous things, from fuel and oil, biohazards from all that lavatory water and perhaps
injured or deceased persons."
As soon as possible, depending on the time of the accident, the investigators hold
an organizational meeting to brief everyone on the rules of the investigation and to assign
people to groups that will focus on particular areas of the investigation, such as the
aircraft systems, human factors, or weather. "Not much happens until after that
organizational meeting is conducted," says Sullivan. The group members come from all
disciplines within the aviation industry-air traffic control operators, pilots and
engineers, to name a few. "The composition of the team is a unique thing that makes our
investigation extremely thorough and rather broad in scope and that allows us to get
deeply into each one of those areas," says Macintosh.
Investigators spend about a week's worth of long, tiresome days out at the crash
site. The schedule is grueling: wake up at 5 a.m., hold a meeting before breakfast, and be
at the site by 7 a.m. Spend most of the day placing tags on identifiable parts of the plane
and surveying the scene for anything unusual. "We try to get the Cockpit Voice Recorder
and Flight Data Recorder"-the infamous black boxes--"and secure those and get them
back to our lab at headquarters," says Sullivan. There is a progress meeting every
afternoon. "That's where we gather and ask, 'What more do we have to do? Where are
we gonna take this thing?"' says Macintosh. A separate informational meeting is held for
the press and families of victims. The day doesn't really end until 8 or 9 p.m., when the
team sends a progress report back to headquarters.
"You don't investigate the whole accident at the 'hole' or on the airfield," says
Macintosh. More gets done back in the labs in Washington. That's where the black boxes
are analyzed, where investigators listen to the cockpit voice recorders, where the jagged
pieces of metal are sent so metallurgists can determine which parts broke first. "Those
people aren't going to go to the site and tramp around in the wreckage, but they're going
to do their thing," says MacIntosh.
Months of investigation culminate with a public hearing, open to visitors. Dozens
of witnesses, from flight academy directors to metallurgists to mechanics who worked on
the aircraft months earlier, are sworn in and questioned regarding the accident. The size
of the public audience usually reflects the magnitude of the accident. Flight 191 was
extremely high profile; the hearing, which took place over 10 days at a hotel near O'Hare
later that summer, drew crowds.
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Chairman Driver's opening statement reminded the attendees that the sole
purpose of the hearing was to determine "the facts, conditions, and circumstances
concerning this accident." He continued, "The inquiry is not being held for the purpose of
determining the rights or liabilities of the private parties, and matters dealing with such
rights will be excluded from these proceedings." Probable cause would be determined
later, and so would the NTSB's recommendations. For now, Driver only wanted the facts.
The NTSB has no legal power to enforce their recommendations (that is FAA
territory), but usually enforcement isn't necessary. Sullivan estimates that 80 percent of
the recommendations are adopted voluntarily. "I think most are adopted because they are
legitimate problems and reasonable solutions," she says. "People in the industry want to
do the right thing. Nobody wants to design an airplane that fails...You don't want to be
told, 'I told you so."'
MacIntosh emphasizes that the product of the agency is to make transportation
safer. "And if you look at the statistics over the past ten to fifteen years," he says, "it has
improved, and a lot of its improvement is in engineering and training. We're flying more
hours now, to more places, and have registered a lot less accidents," he notes. "We used
to do fifteen to twenty major accidents a year. We used to have a transport plane
smacking into a hill all the time. The advent of all the safety systems on the plane and
safety maintenance procedures have really made the industry come a long way." The
statistics prove his point. In 1984, there were over 3,000 accidents, resulting in more than
1,000 deaths. In 2003, those numbers had been cut almost in half.
"There is a great amount of satisfaction at the end of the day knowing that what
you did made a difference," says Sullivan. It makes up for the trying lifestyle of the
profession, both physically and emotionally. Sullivan speaks of the lack of stability that
being an investigator leads to in her personal life, "Being on call and not having control
over your life; not knowing where you're going or when you're coming back...It has
gotten better now, but when you start missing holidays with your kids, and their
birthdays...but then there's a lot of good sides of it that make you stay."
The investigators who arrived at the scene of Flight 191 had a long haul ahead of
them. How could so many deaths and so much wreckage possibly lead to
recommendations for safer travel? But before they could worry about how to prevent a
repeat accident, before they could worry about when to stop asking questions, they had to
figure out where to start. With no survivors and hardly any useful wreckage to work with,
a natural starting point was to hear what the eye-witnesses had to say.
The witnesses told essentially the same story: the plane accelerated down the
runway heading northwest, and everything seemed normal. But then, immediately after
take-off, or maybe just before, (most likely during the plane's "rotation"--the few
seconds of take-off when the nose lifts off the ground but the rear wheels are still rolling
down the runway), the left engine broke free from the wing. It flipped up and over the
wing and came to a skidding stop about three quarters of the way down the runway. The
rest of the plane continued its take-off climb.
As eye-witness accounts are notoriously inaccurate, some of the details were
inconsistent. One account said the engine burst into flames, but investigators later found
no evidence of fire. What the witness probably saw was the engine "torching," an effect
sometimes seen when an engine quickly bums off excess fuel but is not actually on fire.
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Some reported seeing white smoke trailing from the wing, and one estimated that the
airplane's takeoff speed was about 50 mph (which would have made it physically
impossible for the plane to lift off the ground.) Some thought the plane rose to about 400
feet before beginning its fall, others thought only 200 feet.
But everyone agreed that within seconds of take off, the plane banked sharply to
the left, more than 90 degrees, so the wings were practically perpendicular to the ground.
Then the nose began to dive, almost as if the plane were entering a mid-air cartwheel.
Being already so close to the ground, the plane crashed almost immediately. Some
witnesses thought the pilots were struggling for control, others thought the pilots had
control and miraculously avoided the adjacent trailer park, and still others described the
plane as shaking-up and down, up and down-indicating no control at all.
Robert J. Graham, a supervisor of production control and aircraft maintenance for
American Airlines, had perhaps the best vantage point. He was waiting to cross the
runway in his van as Flight 191 accelerated towards him. He told the investigators what
he saw: "As the aircraft got closer," he said, "I noticed what appeared to be vapor or
smoke of some type coming from the leading edge of the wing and the No. 1 engine
pylon. I noticed that the No. 1 engine was bouncing up and down quite a bit, and just
about the time the aircraft got opposite my position and started rotation, the engine came
off, went up over the top of the wing, and rolled back down onto the runway."
Before it went over the wing, he said, the engine went forward and up, "just as if
it had lift and was actually climbing." It didn't strike the top of the wing on it's way.
Rather, it followed the clear path of the air flow of the wing, up and over the top of it,
then down below the tail.
Graham continued to watch the plane as it climbed a "fairly normal climb, until it
started a turn to the left. And at that point, I thought he was going to come back to the
airport."
The most alarming aspect of the witness stories was that the engine fell off. An
engine falling off was unsettling to everyone involved, to say the least. Driver told the
Chicago Tribune that he had never heard of such a thing happening before. At the crash
site, a reporter asked investigator Ed McAvoy, "Have you ever seen an engine fall off of
a plane before?" McAvoy responded with a simple "No." "How long have you been
doing this job?" the reporter asked. "Too long," said McAvoy.
"Engines don't drop off by themselves," says MacIntosh. Something had gone
terribly wrong. The engine showed no evidence of fire damage, so an explosion was ruled
out early on. The witnesses said that the engine breaking loose was the first sign of
failure-that is, they didn't see anything hit the engine to make it fall off. Investigators
searched the runway for other pieces of the plane that might have fallen off before the
engine; they couldn't find anything. The failure must not have come from outside forces,
but from within the pylon itself.
The fact that the engine fell off indicated a weakness somewhere in the pylon,
says MacIntosh. Heads turned immediately to aircraft maintenance. Maybe a part was left
out during a routine check-up, or maybe a piece had been manufactured incorrectly, "And
that was their first thought," he says. The only time those areas are exposed is during
maintenance; so maintenance quickly became a prime suspect.
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The NTSB formed a separate committee to do a background check on the
maintenance of Flight 191-hardly a simple task in a time when records were kept on
paper, not computers. Investigators pored over thousands of pages of documentation that
comprised Flight 191's nine-year maintenance history. They revisited every routine
check-up, every filed complaint, and studied the DC-1 O's design and certification
documents, looking for any signs of trouble or anything out of the ordinary. The group
worked quickly and within a matter of days they found the smoking gun.
Two months before the crash, the accident aircraft had been at the American
Airlines maintenance facility in Tulsa, Oklahoma for a routine check. During its two day
stay, it also underwent a special procedure to replace spherical bearings, a procedure that
involved removing the engine and pylon from the wing.
McDonnell Douglas had prescribed this operation a few years earlier in a Service
Bulletin sent out to all DC-10 operators. Service bulletins are used to officially alert
airlines of problems (big or small) with a plane and typically come with instructions on
how to fix the problem. Unless the manufacturer specifies a time limit, airlines tend to
wait until the airplane is in the shop for a maintenance overhaul to carry out a bulletin's
procedure. As a result, it is not uncommon for non-critical bulletins to go unaddressed for
months, or even years.
American Airlines began replacing spherical bearings on its planes in December
of 1978. By that time, United and Continental Airlines had already completed their own
replacements. The engineers at American Airlines had heard that the other airlines were
removing the pylon and engine from the wing as a single unit, (instead of removing them
one at a time, as McDonnell Douglas' instructions said to do), and decided to follow suit.
Removing the engine and pylon as a single unit seemed like a good idea at the
time. For one thing, it saved almost 200 man hours of maintenance per aircraft. But more
importantly, it seemed safer. Removing the two as a unit would reduce the number of
disconnects (of hydraulic and fuel lines, or electrical cables, for example) from 79 to 27.
The fewer the disconnects, the fewer the opportunities for damage or error.
But what the engineers at American Airlines who adopted and modified the new
procedure didn't know was that Continental Airlines had, on two occasions, damaged a
flange-an arched piece of metal that helps secure the rear part of the engine to the
wing-while raising the engine and pylon as a unit back to the wing.
American wasn't alone in its ignorance. The FAA, which is supposed to be
notified of major maintenance problems, didn't learn of Continental's damaged flanges
until after the crash of Flight 191. It is up to the airlines to report major problems to the
FAA; but it is also the airline's prerogative to decide what constitutes a major problem.
As such, news of the damaged flanges slipped through the cracks.
The investigators were quick to pick it up. While the maintenance committee
uncovered Continental's flange problem by searching through documents, a separate
branch of investigators was homing in on the same story by searching through physical
evidence.
The afternoon and morning following the crash, investigators combed the grass
around the runway for bits and pieces of the airplane that fell off with the engine. They
found just about every piece of the engine/pylon assembly, but it was a single bolt that
got all the attention.
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The bolt belonged to the thrust link assembly, the part of the pylon attachment
that holds the engine in place under the enormous thrust forces experienced during
takeoff. The bolt was cracked. This particular broken bolt, just one among hundreds of
twisted, mangled shards of metal, was important to investigators because they thought
that the way it was fractured showed signs of fatigue. They thought this bolt might have
already been broken, or about to break, before the accident. It might even have been the
first piece to break.
The notion of pre-existing damage sent waves of anxiety through the aviation
community. Until the NTSB determined what had caused the damage, they had to assume
the worst: that there was an inherent problem with the design of the airplane, and that this
problem could be present on any or every DC-10 in service. They had to act fast.
The bolt was sent right away to a lab in Washington, D.C, where metallurgists
would figure out how, when, and why it broke. In the meantime, the NTSB and FAA
weren't taking any chances with the remaining 134 DC-10s in service in the United
States. On Sunday night, the FAA issued the first of several Airworthiness Directives
(legally binding orders, or commands). The Directive required every airline that operated
DC-O1 s to inspect the thrust link assemblies, looking for evidence of damage similar to
that on the accident aircraft. Until the inspections were completed and parts replaced as
necessary, the planes were not allowed to fly.
On Monday, the stakes were raised when investigators found another piece of the
Flight 191 aircraft that looked like it could have been damaged before the accident. The
aft bulkhead flange had a 10-inch long fracture just below one of the points where the
pylon attaches to the wing.
Now there were two pieces that could have triggered the massive structural
failure: the bolt and the flange. Nobody could say for sure if the bolt had gone first,
causing the flange to break, or if the flange broke first and in turn damaged the bolt. "We
don't know which came first, the chicken or the egg," one investigator told the Chicago
Tribune.
Either way, the FAA had to revise its inspection orders to take into account the
latest findings. That night it issued the next Airworthiness Directive, this time asking
inspectors to look for damage to the flanges as well as the bolt in the thrust link assembly.
This Airworthiness Directive came with a stringent time limit: any plane that hadn't been
inspected by Tuesday at 2 a.m. (Chicago time) would be grounded until further notice.
As of late Monday night, things were looking promising for the airlines. The
results of the first inspections were rolling in and so far no problems had been found. "It
appeared...that most of the inspections would be completed by that deadline and no major
air service disruptions were expected," the Tribune wrote.
Everyone was in for a big surprise.
By Tuesday, news began to spread that some of the inspections had turned up
problems on Northwest and United Airlines DC-lOs. Once the airlines knew what to look
for and where to look for it, cracks started showing up everywhere. By the end of the
inspections, eight aircraft had been found to have overload cracks in the same area of the
pylon that was damaged on the accident aircraft.
And two United Airlines mechanics had found a "wobbly" engine-an engine
they could rock back and forth, fairly easily, by hand. "We removed the access panels
and found cracks so big you could trip over them," one of the mechanics said at the time.
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"Rivets were broken, fasteners were sheared. It gives you a funny feeling in the pit of
your stomach to see the extent of that damage." On the whole, though, broken parts were
replaced and aircraft were returned to service in no time. The FAA approved the
inspections and added a stipulation that the planes had to undergo rigorous inspections
every 100 hours of flight or every 10 days (whichever came first). By Friday, one week
after the crash, all but a handful of DC-lOs were back in full service.
But not for long. The metallurgist's report was in: the bolt cracked under extreme
and sudden stress, not because of built up fatigue. The flange broke first. Then, on
Monday, June 4, new cracks were found on two airplanes-airplanes that had passed
inspections just a week earlier. This finding coincided with the maintenance committee's
discovery that several airlines could have caused damage to the flanges during
maintenance by removing the engine and pylon as a single unit. There was a simple and
obvious correlation: some of the planes that turned up with cracks during the inspections
a week before had also had their engines and pylons removed as a single unit during
maintenance, months earlier. Investigators thought for a while the two new cracks were
caused by maintenance, and had simply been overlooked in the first round of inspections.
But by Tuesday night, investigators weren't certain. They suspected that the latest cracks
might have developed in the 100 hours since the last inspection-not during
maintenance. Simply put, everyone was confused.
"At a certain point in time, we felt confident that we knew what was causing the
cracks," FAA official Melvin Beard recalled at the hearing later that summer. "We had
seen some of them, looked at some of them in detail, and we felt confident that we could
find any crack, or that we were going to find any crack," he continued. "It was when two
additional cracks were found on aircraft that reportedly had been inspected previously
that our certitude...waned."
"I honestly felt at 6 p.m. Tuesday that we had it firmly under control for the first
time," Charles Foster, associate administrator for aviation standards, told the Washington
Post. But five hours later, with a little more information, he was a lot less certain.
Langhorne Bond, administrator of the FAA, spoke to Foster later that night on the phone.
Bond's spokesman told the Washington Post about the conversations: "Foster was saying,
'Jesus Christ, we can't go into court now and say we have this under control. It would be
perjury."'
Bond didn't sit by idly. In the interest of public safety, drastic measures had to be
taken-measures the NTSB didn't have the authority to take. Langhorne Bond stepped
up to the plate and hit one out of the park: on Wednesday, June 6, the FAA grounded all
U.S-operated DC-10s indefinitely.
The FAA suspended the DC- O's type certificate, the equivalent of having your
driver's license, passport, and birth certificate invalidated, thereby making it illegal to fly
the aircraft under any circumstances. Grounding a fleet of airplanes is a last resort for the
FAA. The agency's mission is to promote and encourage aviation; so by taking dozens of
aircraft out of service, Bond was jeopardizing the very industry his job was meant to
protect. That conflict of interest had weighed heavily on his decision, but until
investigators could get a handle on the situation, he hardly had a choice.
In the following weeks of early summer, the country's DC-1 Os stood with their
wheels planted firmly on the ground; airlines scrambled to rearrange flight schedules
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around the immobilized fleet; and investigators took a closer look at American Airlines
maintenance.
The practice of removing the pylon and engine as a unit was immediately
prohibited, and investigators closed in on the Tulsa maintenance facility for a
discriminating look at the rest of the steps in the procedure. As it turned out, removing
the engine and pylon as a unit was only the beginning of the problems.
Back in 1978, when mechanics were carrying out the service bulletin on the first
planes, they ran into some trouble while removing the engine and pylon. When they
removed the bolts and bearings in the order that the manufacturer's manual instructed
them to, the last few were really difficult to get out. The simple solution-to change the
order in which they removed the bolts and bearings-was put into effect without
consulting McDonnell Douglas or the FAA. The maintenance engineers at American
Airlines didn't think changing the order of the steps was a significant deviation.
In fact, it was not uncommon to deviate slightly from the manufacturer's manual.
At the hearing, American Airlines vice president of engineering William P. Hannan
explained that, "In many of the cases you can't really do it the way the manufacturer has
written a procedure. They are required at the beginning to write literally thousands of
procedures based on the knowledge they have at that time. So if you get into a part of the
airplane, deep into the airplane fairly early, a procedure may not cover that, or it may be
based on how the airplane is put together, not what you do in service."
The investigators didn't share the mechanics' nonchalant approach to procedural
changes. They studied the metal stress that could arise from removing the bolts and
bearings in the wrong order, and found that under some circumstances, removing the
connections the way American Airlines did could cause the flange to bear some of the
weight of the engine and pylon assembly that it wasn't designed to bear. The result could
be a fatigue crack similar to that found on Flight 191.
The investigators didn't stop there. They stayed in Tulsa, looking at every step of
the procedure, and found more deviations. "I recall talking to some of the investigation
team after I joined the Safety Board in 1988 about the procedural things that they pursued
in the process of the investigation," says MacIntosh, who was the Investigator In Charge
of the famous 1989 DC-10 crash in Sioux City, in which the pilots miraculously landed
the plane after all three hydraulic systems had been destroyed in flight-at about 30,000
feet. "We discussed how they visited the American Airlines maintenance facility and
went through step by step the engine change procedures that were being used and how
they were, let me find the right word here, they were 'surprised' with the use of an
industrial fork lift in the process rather than the traditional engine change cradle or lifting
devices." The investigators didn't think the forklift was adequate for the job. Some of the
mechanics agreed that that the forklift was difficult to operate. "The down movement
wasn't correct on [the forklift]," one of the mechanics testified at the hearing. "When you
would move the lever to the down position, there seemed to be a spot or an area in there
where the forklift would come down and it wasn't smooth when it would first start."
Not only was it hard to operate, but the particular forklift used for Flight 191
happened to have run out of gas in the middle of the procedure, and that particular model
forklift, when it runs out of gas, has the tendency to drift downward a matter of inches
every hour. An unintended downward drift like that could have caused the flange to bear
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some of the weight of the engine and pylon assembly that it was not meant to bear, and so
could have been responsible for the crack in the flange.
Investigators could not determine for sure what had caused the crack in the
flange-whether it was removing the engine and pylon as a unit, or changing the order in
which the bolts and bearings were removed, or if it was using the forklift instead of the
engine cradle to support the assembly. But what they did determine, more importantly,
was that communications among maintenance crews, manufacturers and the FAA were
unsound.
The mentality of the maintenance workers' culture baffled the safety board. What
appeared to investigators as a flagrant deviation from procedure was, to the maintenance
workers, a somewhat casual decision. The idea that crew workers were making changes
to manufacturer's instructions concerned investigators, while maintenance crews
shrugged it off as just part of the job. "We use a lot of common sense in this industry,"
one of them said at the hearing.
But it was more than just the mechanics' attitudes that troubled investigators; it
was that the system of keeping maintenance records allowed major and minor errors to go
unnoticed. Also, the way the crews signed the work cards made it almost impossible to
determine exactly who had completed what job. Jobs that required only one person to do
them had three signatures on the card. "The crew just normally signs together," one
maintenance worker said at the hearing.
The crash investigation, while revealing flaws in the mechanics of the aircraft,
also opened the doors to criticism of the FAA's organization and policies and cast a
shadow over McDonnell Douglas. People started to wonder why the manufacturer and
the FAA hadn't known about the faulty maintenance procedures. The FAA began to fall
out of favor across the board. Passengers and airlines were concerned that the FAA
wasn't giving airline maintenance enough attention, while McDonnell Douglas, on the
other hand, felt that the FAA was overreacting, or over compensating, by grounding the
DC-10 fleet. The European equivalent of the FAA, which had followed suit in grounding
its DC-lOs, decided a few weeks later to un-ground its planes, challenging the unspoken
authority of the FAA and further adding to public's distrust of the agency.
McDonnell Douglas suffered from similar public distrust. The DC-10 already had
a tarnished safety record-in 1974, a plane crashed near Paris after a rear cargo door
blew off the plane. The immediate loss of pressure caused the cabin floor to collapse,
which in turn severed the control lines running to the tail. The crash killed all 345 people
on board. Just one year earlier, in a similar accident, a cargo door came off of an
American Airlines flight over Windsor, Ontario, but the pilots managed to land that
plane. After the investigations determined the cargo door design was inadequate,
McDonnell Douglas redesigned the doors and issued a Service Bulletin requiring airlines
to adopt the changes. But the FAA did not issue even a single Airworthiness Directive-
which always draws negative media attention to the manufacturer-in response to these
two incidents.
Flight 191, on the other hand, resulted in three Airworthiness Directives and a 38-
day grounding of the fleet. Passengers became wary of DC-10s, and airlines slowed or
canceled their orders for new planes. In time, passenger skepticism subsided, but the
damage was already done. Two years after the crash, The New York Times reported that
the repercussions of Flight 191 had "stopped the sales momentum of the DC-10 and, in
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part, prevented McDonnell Douglas from aggressively developing a new generation of
planes," which some argue was one of the main reasons the company fell behind its
competitors in the 1980s. Throughout the 1990s, McDonnell Douglas designed aircraft
for the military and upgraded the DC-9 and DC- 10, but still did not develop any newly
conceived commercial aircraft. In 1998, the company merged with its long-time
competitor, Boeing.
Just two months after the crash of Flight 191, investigators had narrowed the
search down to three main maintenance flaws and had opened the floodgates to countless
procedural deficiencies. But even then, the investigation was far from over. The question
of why the plane couldn't fly without an engine remained to be answered.
At approximately 3 p.m. on May 25, Flight 191 rounded the comer onto the
runway and laid on the throttle. The leading edge slats were extended for takeoff, giving
the wings a little extra curvature, which in turn gives them a little extra lift. As air flows
over and under the plane's wings, it travels faster over the top of the wing than the
bottom-because the top is curved more than the bottom, and so the distance over it is
farther. The faster traveling air has a lower pressure than the slower air underneath the
wing. As a result, there is a net force upwards on the wings. This phenomenon is called
"lift."
Pilots prefer to take off "into the wind"--that is, going against the wind. The
faster the plane is going relative to the air around it, the more lift it will have. Take-off
speeds are typically measured in "knots of indicated airspeed" (KIAS)-that is, how fast
the plane is moving relative to the air around it, because the amount of lift a plane has
depends on its speed relative to the air, not the ground. Taking-off into the wind allows
the air to travel fast over the wing without the plane having to build up as much ground
speed.
From the outside, the trip down the runway looks simple: Go fast enough, get
enough lift, and the plane will take off. But inside the cockpit there's a lot more going on.
Before the plane even begins to taxi out to the runway, the pilots must calculate the take-
off speed based on the weight of the aircraft, runway length and wind speed and
direction. There are a few different "take-off speeds." First, there is the speed at which a
plane can become airborne, if all the engines have power and if the pilots choose to lift
off. That is what pilots call "V-l." If an engine fails before the plane gets to V-1, the
pilots can theoretically abort the take-off and bring the plane to a safe and controlled
landing before reaching the end of the runway. In fact, in this situation, pilot manuals
require that he do so.
But if an engine fails after the plane reaches V-l, there won't be enough room left
on the runway to safely stop the plane, so the pilot is required to continue with the take-
off. But, if this happens, he will most likely circle around and return for an emergency
landing.
Even though a plane is capable of becoming airborne after it passes through V-l,
there is another speed marker which must be met before the pilots are allowed to initiate
takeoff: V-2. If an engine fails some time after V-1 but before V-2, not only does the
plane not have enough room to stop on the runway, but it doesn't have enough speed to
render the control surfaces (the rudder, the ailerons, for example) strong enough to
control the yawing motion, or twisting of the plane, that would occur because of the
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sudden loss of power in one engine. So, the pilots must wait until the plane reaches V-2
before leaving the ground. And typically, they won't take-off until the plane passes
through a third speed, "V-R" (R for rotation), that allows for some margin of error.
Flight 191 made it to V-R without any trouble. But as the plane began its rotation,
the flange in the left wing finally gave way, and then a bolt cracked, leaving the engine
and pylon hanging onto the wing as if by a thread at only two other attachment points.
Under the extreme force of the engine's take-off thrust, the remaining attachments didn't
have a chance of holding on.
Bolts began breaking, and the engine and pylon separated completely from the
wing, flew up and over it and destroyed a portion of the leading edge of the wing,
severing the hydraulic lines, electrical wires and slat followup cables along the way.
Having already long passed V-l, the pilots were committed to taking off, even
though they had literally lost an engine. To complicate matters, the pilots probably had no
idea that the engine had fallen off. There is no clear view from the cockpit to the part of
the wings from which the engines hang. In fact, most of the fuselage and wings are in a
massive blind spot.
But that shouldn't have mattered. The DC-10 was designed to be flyable even in
the event that an engine falls off a wing. But when the engine fell off of Flight 191, it also
damaged a number of critical systems along the way.
One of those systems was the hydraulics. Hydraulic systems in airplanes, like
power steering in a car, make it easy to move very large components of the plane from a
joystick, or yoke, in the cockpit. Whereas older planes use a system of cables and pulleys
to translate the movement of a yoke, newer planes use hydraulics. The important control
surfaces are all hydraulically powered: the rudder, which is on the tail and controls the
heading angle; the elevators, which also reside on the tail and can force the nose of the
plane to point up or down; the ailerons, or flaps that reside on top of the wing surface and
control the bank angle by stopping the airflow over a wing and forcing it down; and the
slats, the wing extensions that give the wings more curvature and therefore more lift, for
takeoff and landing.
A DC- 10 has three hydraulic systems. If any one hydraulic system fails, the other
two are strong enough to manage the controls themselves. And in many cases, when one
system fails, the other two can isolate the failure and share hydraulic pressure with the
rest of the failed system. Ideally, critical redundant systems (systems that are essential for
flight, like electric or hydraulic lines) are not placed right next to each other. Instead, they
are separated by some amount of space within the aircraft. The idea is that a single
catastrophic event should not be able to damage a primary system and its backups in one
fell swoop.
But when the engine separated from Flight 191, it destroyed more than one
hydraulic line in the wing-lines that ran practically alongside each other due to space
constraints. There was no way to regain hydraulic pressure. The No. 1 hydraulic lines
began to bleed like severed veins. And as hydraulic pressure was lost, the leading edge
slats on the left wing slowly began to retract, because now there was less and less
pressure holding them extended and the force of the oncoming air pressure was pushing
them back in.
Meanwhile, the rest of the plane still had its hydraulic pressure. The slats on the
right wing remained extended and caused a dangerous asymmetry. The right wing, with
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its slats extended, had plenty of lift; the left wing did not. Without its slats extended, the
left wing didn't have enough lift to keep flying, and it stalled. Consequently, the plane
entered a left turn, just as a car would if the brakes were suddenly applied to the wheels
on only the driver's side. As the plane turned, it stopped climbing and began its descent,
only twenty seconds after takeoff.
In most cases, entering a stall should not cause a plane to crash. After all, paper
airplanes stall and recover on their own all the time. The familiar flight pattern of
swooping up to a dead stop then entering a sharp dive that is so distinctive of paper
airplanes is nothing more than a series of stalls and recoveries. Commercial jets will
perform much the same way-although a little guidance from the pilots always helps.
The procedure for recovering from a stall is second nature to any commercial pilot:
increase engine power and point the nose down. Get going fast enough and you'll be
flying again.
Amateur pilots commonly and sometimes fatally err by pulling back on the yoke
when the plane stalls and enters its natural dive, as planes are designed to do. A plane's
natural tendency to enter a dive during a stall is intentionally enhanced by the
manufacturers who make sure that a plane's center of gravity is slightly forward of the
middle of the plane. But by pulling back on the yoke, an amateur pilot trying in vain to
counter the dive would actually just be slowing the plane down. If the plane slows down,
it won't regain enough speed to regain lift and start flying again, and as such, won't ever
recover from the stall. The correct response to a stall, counterintuitive though it may
seem, is to push forward on the yoke and encourage the plane to dive at its top speed until
it can be brought under control again.
Another trick to recovering from a stall is to make sure that it doesn't happen in
the first place. According to Walter Estridge, the Director of American Airlines flight
academy at the time of the Flight 191 crash, "Our primary methodology and training on
stall recover is to, number one, avoid the condition, recognize a situation which may lead
to a stall situation, and avoid getting there. That is the first and most primary. The next
thing would be the next recognition cue that one gets indicating a stall. Then the stall
recover procedure would be executed."
If it does happen that a pilot finds himself entering a stall, it helps if he is already
at a high enough altitude that pointing the nose down won't immediately drive the plane
into the ground. A few thousand feet above ground level would make most pilots
nervous. When Flight 191 stalled, it was only 400 feet off the ground. If the pilots had
tried to recover from the stall by entering a dive to gain speed, the result would have been
the same: immediate impact with the ground. The only option the pilots had to recover
from the stall was to increase the power in the remaining engines and hope that that
would get the plane flying fast enough to regain lift on the left wing.
But the pilots didn't increase the power in the other engines. They decreased
power and pitched the plane up. They were following the procedure for an engine loss-
that is, the loss of power in an engine, not the physical loss of an engine. Power loss in an
engine is hardly a rare event. "Engine failures happen on a regular (but unscheduled)
basis," says MacIntosh. "But aircraft are brought to the ground by skilled airmen. If
you've ever had a car engine go out while you're driving, and you have to steer it back to
the curb, it's about three times heavier when the power steering goes out. But people
don't just lose control of the vehicle when that happens." Said NTSB investigator
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McAvoy at the time of the crash, "He could have flown the thing all the way to LA. The
problem was not the engines; it was a low altitude. He was at such a low altitude that he
did not have time to take corrective action."
When an engine does lose power, a series of automatic events occur. First, the
other engine or engines kick into overdrive. Normally, for take-off, the power settings of
the engines (N1) is about 80 percent of their full capability. But when one engine loses
power, the others compensate and reach levels above 100 percent-the equivalent of a
car's tachometer venturing into that forbidden red zone. In the cockpit, the pilot or first
officer will see the power meter for one engine drop to zero while the others flare up.
He'll also hear a chirping sound and see a warning light indicated the loss of power in an
engine. Whichever person is not handling the controls at the moment calls "engine out"
and names the engine which has lost power. The pilot handling the controls is supposed
to slow the plane down, and, if the plane is still climbing in altitude right after take-off,
he is supposed to level out the climb angle. If the pilot were to keep flying at top speed,
the other engines would be quickly overworked and damaged. So the pilots of Flight 191,
knowing for sure that they had lost power in the No. 1 engine, but not knowing for sure
much else, slowed the plane down.
In a bizarre and unfortunate twist of fate, the damage caused by the engine/pylon
separation disabled some, but not all, of the cockpit warnings and indicators. The "engine
out" warning light worked just fine. But the stall warning didn't work at all. Neither did
the slat disagreement warning. So, while the plane was slowing down and entering an
asymmetric-stall induced left turn, the only information the pilots had access to told them
they were dealing with an engine failure and a little turbulence.
Estridge described the situation in the cockpit as "extremely difficult, if not
impossible," to assess in the time period that the crew of Flight 191 were faced with. At
the hearing, when asked whether under those chaotic conditions the pilots acted as they
were trained to do, he answered simply: "I was extremely proud."
It was difficult to figure out exactly what the pilots knew and didn't know in the
31 seconds of flight. It was impossible from the wreckage to tell whether they had tried to
move the ailerons to counter the left turn, or moved the elevator to keep the nose from
diving into the ground. The flight simulator tests at least showed investigators what could
have been done. When pilots were thoroughly briefed on the details of Flight 191, they
were able to bring the plane under control in the simulators. But when they went into the
simulation with no background information, they acted exactly as the pilots of Flight 191
did, and the simulation ended in a nearly identical crash. As far as finding out what really
happened in the cockpit, investigators had to tap into the next source of evidence: the
black box.
The black box always gets a lot of media attention. It is the one piece of the plane
that is designed to hold all the information concerning what went on in the plane's final
moments. Actually, there are two black boxes, and they aren't black at all-they are
painted fluorescent orange to make them easy to find and recover amidst wreckage. One
of the boxes is the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), which records everything heard in the
cockpit, and the other is the digital flight data recorder (DFDR) which, in 1979, recorded
only a handful of flight parameters such as engine thrust, pitch angle, and attitude. It also
recorded the pilot's actions (for instance, whether he tried to move the ailerons) and it
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records how much the ailerons actually moved as a result. In some cases, the black boxes
are never recovered, or are too damaged to be of any use to the investigation. But in the
case of Flight 191, the boxes were recovered, and with the help of corroborating
evidence, investigators were able to glean a fairly accurate profile of the flight.
The CVR had almost no information on the tape. The box itself wasn't terribly
damaged, but when the engine and pylon tore through some of the plane's electric lines,
the CVR lost power and stopped recording. The last sound was a thump, followed by the
word "damn," just one second before takeoff. Investigators were never able to hear what
the pilots said during the next 31 seconds of flight; they were never able to figure out
how much the pilots knew as the plane was going down.
Nevertheless, the CVR was of some use to the investigation. The fact that it lost
power clued investigators in to the electrical situation in the cockpit. If the CVR lost
power, then everything else on that circuit must have also lost power. That bit of
information was the starting point to figuring out exactly what was and was not working
in the cockpit during the flight.
First, investigators had to learn all about the DC-1 Os wiring. The complexity of
the drawings and descriptions of the electrical system is magnificent. "It's not like a DC-
3 wiring system," said Serge Clayton, the principal staff engineer in electrical design at
McDonnell Douglas, during the hearing. "It is a little more involved...I think I could line
up those books on the table for you, but you would need a pretty good-sized table."
Very simply put, there are three electrical systems on a DC-10, each powered by
one of the three engines. There are also some back-up and air powered generators, one of
which is a 30-minute power supply for the captain's instruments, essential
communication instruments, and navigation equipment. But the backup power source
doesn't automatically kick in. It must be manually activated by the flick of a switch on
the pilot's overhead panel.
The redundancy in the electrical system is impressive. In addition to having three
separately powered systems, there are layers of protective circuitry that automatically
isolate problems so they don't spread and damage the rest of the system. The isolation
mechanism works just like a circuit breaker in the basement of a house: when one circuit
in the house gets overloaded (maybe because someone is using the toaster and the
hairdryer at the same time), the circuit breaker cuts off the current supply to that part of
the house. That ensures that the wires running through the walls don't get overheated and
overloaded with current; it ensures that they don't catch fire.
In an airplane, it is essential to protect the electrical components from being
damaged. If a current surge is detected in a generator, for example, the electrical system
will engage a "lockout mechanism"-one of the layers of protective circuitry-to protect
the rest of the airplane's wiring from damage. The lockout mechanism isolates the faulty
generator and all of its wiring from the rest of the system. Any components that were
supposed to be powered by the generator lose power as a result, but the rest of the
electrical system continues to function as if nothing went wrong.
When the engine fell off Flight 191, the electrical system went haywire. "When
the separation took place, of course the wiring just literally massively failed," said
Clayton. First, the loss of the engine meant the loss of the generator that the engine had
powered. In addition, when the engine tore free, it ripped through electrical wires in the
wing. "The way those generator feeders had been cut...it appeared as though someone
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had taken a big ax and just cut them in two," said Clayton. The result was disastrous. The
lockout mechanism went into effect, as it was designed to do, to protect the rest of the
airplane's wiring. But because it isolated the No. 1 system, a number of the aircraft's
systems and instruments immediately lost power. Among these systems were the
captain's flight instruments, the left stall warning computer, the stickshaker motor (which
causes the yoke to physically shake when the plane is entering a stall, so the pilot, whose
hands are always on the yoke, cannot help but notice the warning), and the slat disagree
warning light system. Portions of the DFDR sensors and the CVR were also disabled.
The lockout mechanism on Flight 191 could have been unlocked. Power could
have been restored to some of the cockpit instruments. But the pilots, in their urgency to
regain control of the plane, were most likely too preoccupied to take that action fast
enough. If the pilots had unlocked the mechanism, they would have restored power to the
captain's flight instruments as well as some of the engine instruments-and perhaps had
enough information to understand the problem and recover from the stall. There was a
flight engineer in the cockpit who would have had his hands free and could have flicked
the switch to restore power, but in take-off position, the flight engineer cannot reach the
panel. According the accident report, "He must reposition his seat to face his panel,
release his safety belt, and get out of his seat to reach the switches."
Investigators were able to learn more about what happened in the cockpit from the
DFDR, which was slightly damaged, but contained substantial information. It recorded
50 seconds of data during the take-off and roll and 31 seconds of airborne data before the
recording ended on impact. Two seconds before take-off, just before the word "damn"
was heard in the cockpit, the DFDR recorded the last stable thrust reading for the No. 1
engine. Two seconds later, as the engine separated, it stopped recording the positions of
the left inboard aileron, left inboard elevator, lower rudder and two of the leading edge
slats-all of which had been powered by the now defunct No. 1 electric power generator.
The plane climbed normally for the first 9 seconds of flight. It got up to a speed of
172 knots relative to the air (KIAS). But then it began to slow down. Eleven seconds later
the plane began its roll to the left. It had slowed down to 159 KIAS, the stall speed for a
wing without extended flaps. The pilots tried to counter the turn by using the ailerons to
force the right wing down, which would have leveled the plane out. The DFDR recorded
this input and also recorded that the ailerons on the right wing did actually move (which
told investigators that the ailerons had been working), but the force just wasn't strong
enough to get the plane level again.
Three seconds before impact, the plane was banked 90 degrees to the left-
perpendicular to the ground. By the time it crashed, it had rolled over onto its back and
was diving nose-first at 21 degrees. According to the DFDR readings of the ailerons,
rudder and elevators, the pilots were doing everything they could to level the plane out.
But even the black boxes couldn't tell the investigators everything they needed to
know. For instance, while the DFDR recorded the settings of the right wing ailerons and
slats, it said nothing about the left wing ailerons. That information was gleaned from the
photographs taken by witnesses.
The photographs were taken from far away; they were blurry and dark and didn't
look promising at first glance. But with a little digital enhancement performed by a lab in
Palo Alto, California, the plane and another segment of its story came into focus. The lab
spent days doing what would only take a few seconds and very little expertise using
20
modem computers. In the late 1970s, at the brink of the digital age, the enhancement was
a highly technical undertaking, but it boils down to one process: the image on the film
was converted into a digital image by placing a grid with thousands of squares over the
picture, shining light through it and measuring the amount of light that passed through
each square. The intensity of the light in each square was assigned a corresponding
number. This array of numbers thus became a "digital" version of the photograph.
Looking at the wings of the plane in the original pictures, the gradations of gray
were so similar that it was impossible to tell the difference between the leading edge slats
and the rest of the wing, let alone whether or not the slats were extended. But with the
digital image, the contrast was easily adjusted. Consider the wing area, which was made
up of very similar shades of gray, and therefore a small range of numbers. By stretching
out the range of numbers (assigning the low end to zero and the high end to 100), the
light grays can become lighter and the dark grays darker. All of a sudden, it was very
clear just where the wing ended and the leading edge slats began.
The enhancement answered a few questions. First, investigators saw that the tail
of the airplane had not been damaged by the engine separation. They also saw that the
nose gear was down during the initial climb, before the roll-a fact that had been difficult
to determine from contradictory witness statements. They saw that the ailerons on the
right wing were extended, which confirmed that the pilots were trying to force the right
wing down to counter the steep left turn they had entered.
It was now clear to investigators why the plane crashed after the engine fell off.
The plane was going too fast to abort the take-off, so the pilots had no choice but to try to
fly the plane. They knew they had lost power in the left engine, and take-off procedures
mandated that they slow the plane down. They probably wouldn't have followed those
procedures if they had known the left slat was retracting. The cockpit instrumentation
should have alerted them to the slat retraction, but didn't. It, too, was faulty because it
had no electrical power. By the time the plane stalled and entered its leftward roll, the
pilots were entirely too uninformed and ill-equipped to handle the situation. From the
moment the engine separated, Flight 191 was doomed.
The story investigators pieced together from the evidence is complicated. But
even more complicated was parsing out exactly which events could have been
prevented-or could be prevented in the future-and how. The ambiguities that the
Flight 191 investigators faced were typical of any investigation. As Galison said, finding
the evidence is only part of the story. Determining the facts and the probable cause is in a
sense just the fuel of the NTSB's fire. The real impact comes with the safety
recommendations.
Sometimes the recommendations can be as simple as telling the airlines to adhere
to the aircraft maintenance manual. Early on in the investigation the NTSB released a few
straightforward recommendations. The first was to put an immediate halt on the practice
of removing the engine and pylon as a unit. The next one concerned the take-off
procedure that required pilots to slow down in the event of an engine loss. When
investigators realized that Flight 191 wouldn't have stalled if the pilots hadn't slowed
down, they recommended altering the take-off procedure. The NTSB also recommended
stronger redundancy to be built into the stall warning system.
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At the same time, they required that all manufacturers provide some kind of
protection against unintended slat retraction during critical phases of flight. As a result,
slat locking devices (which were already present on some models of aircraft) were
universally adopted. Once the slats are extended, they'll stay that way until the pilot
voluntarily brings them back in. MacIntosh described the device as similar to the one that
keeps the trunk of a car open. "Once you open the trunk and let go, it doesn't just come
slamming down. It requires a separate, deliberate action to close it again."
Some of the recommendations were a little less obvious. There is no
straightforward way to address massive hydraulic and electric failures. The systems are
already designed to withstand a certain amount of damage, but clearly nobody imagined
the kind of tragedy that took hold of Flight 191. As Charles Dundore, chief program
engineer of the DC-10, said at the hearing, "it would be unreasonable to try to design
hydraulic piping installations to survive any mode of major structural failure." In fact, if
combined failures were taken into account in the design of the airplane, "from a realistic,
practical point of view," Dundore said, "there would be no aircraft industry. But it isn't
limited to that;. The entire industrial world, wherever we are building things for people to
use, the whole science of engineering is based on assessing some acceptable level of
risk."
Nevertheless, the engine did fall off of Flight 191, and therefore the possibility of
it happening again could not be ignored. The recommendations addressing this issue were
understandably vague. Most of them boiled down to a general plea to the airlines and
manufacturers to "do better next time": Implement better maintenance surveillance and
quality control; pay more attention to hazard analysis before you change a maintenance
procedure; improve communication among the airlines, manufacturer and the FAA. Even
the aircraft's type certificate was scrutinized. One of the more nebulous recommendations
suggested that during the design, manufacturers should take into account more of the
possible failure combinations, as well as difficulties that might arise during maintenance.
The NTSB doesn't offer any specific advice as to how these recommendations should be
implemented. Interpretation is left up to the manufacturers and airlines at which the
recommendations are aimed.
There is no escaping risk, much less a prescribed formula for eliminating it. The
least we can do is put up the good fight. If we let politics, corruption, or ignorance
prevent us from understanding what went wrong and ultimately fixing it, then, as Harvard
historian of science, Peter Galison, says, "the world is a disordered and dangerous place."
These investigations, he continues, "struggle, incompletely and unstably, to hold that
nightmare at bay."
We cannot expect to win the race to eliminate all risk before tragedy crops up; but
perhaps as long as we have a method in place to discover our mistakes, we won't be quite
as likely to fall behind.
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